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SPECIALTY LAW - Illinois Family Law

Illinois Family law cases
Updated through September 10, 2005


The Main File, containing the full text of over 1,850 Illinois family law cases dating back to 1985, is available on CD-ROM. Case coverage includes such toptics as divorce, bigamy, spoual abuse, dissolution, child support and visitation, spousal maintenance, alimony, child neglect and dependency, adoption and parental rights. The database features full word-phrase search capabilities, no on-line charges, monthly internet updates, retrieval of cases by title or citation, network capability, a separate file of recent cases and the ability to print individual cases or save them to a word processing file. Recent cases contained in the Supplemental File are available on this web site. See below for Case Summaries. Full-text of cases is available only to subscribers.



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Illinois Family Law Case Summaries


July 31 - September 10, 2005

June 26 - July 30, 2005

May 22 - June 25, 2005

April 17 - May 21, 2005

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Illinois Family Law Case Summaries


July 31 - September 10, 2005


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Topic List (Click for cases on that subject)

Dependent children -- Family support -- Child custody; Visitation



Dependent children


In re S.F., No. 1-04-1231 (Ill.App. Dist.1 08/01/2005)
This case arises from the termination of the parental rights of respondent Bernice T. to her son, S.F., under section 1(D)(f) of the Illinois Adoption Act . . .. On appeal, respondent challenges the constitutionality of section 1(D)(f). During the pendency of her appeal, our supreme court found a different section of the Adoption Act, section 1(D)(q), unconstitutional in In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 827 N.E.2d 466 (2005). Because we find that the supreme court's analysis in D.W. of section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act . . . also applies to section (1)(D)(f), we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

In re Faith B., No. 2-03-1349 (Ill.App. Dist.2 08/25/2005)
Respondent, Perseta B., appealed a series of orders of the circuit court of Kane County that resulted in placing her two minor children, Stephen B. and Faith B., in guardianships with two maternal aunts. Respondent alleged error in (1) the circuit court's decision to adjudicate the minors abused and neglected and (2) the circuit court's determination that private guardianship is the appropriate permanency goal. We disagreed with respondent's first contention and found we lacked jurisdiction regarding the second. See In re Faith B., 349 Ill. App. 3d 930 (2004). Respondent appealed to the supreme court, which affirmed our decision as to the first point, but found jurisdiction present as to the second. In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d 1 (2005). The supreme court then remanded the case to this court for consideration of respondent's second issue, and we now address it on its merits.

Family support


Murphy v. Murphy, No. 3-04-0142 (Ill.App. Dist.3 08/01/2005)
William ("Bill") and Catherine ("Cathy") Murphy were married on November 18, 1988. Dissolution proceedings between the parties commenced in 1998 and a judgment of dissolution was entered on February 19, 2003. The trial court's rulings, in part, upheld the validity of the parties' antenuptial agreement and ordered Bill to pay Cathy $15,000 per month from November 1, 2003 through May 31, 2007, in maintenance. Cathy appeals.

Michaelson v. Michaelson, No. 1-04-3783 (Ill.App. Dist.1 08/16/2005)
We are asked to determine the meaning of the maintenance provision in the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement. The husband, Robert L. Michaelson (Robert), agreed to pay maintenance to his wife, Anna Marie Michaelson (Anna), for eight years, totaling $360,000. The question is whether the provision provided for maintenance in gross, not subject to termination or modification on Robert's motion. The trial court read the provision to prohibit Robert's attempt to terminate or modify maintenance and ordered him to pay Anna's attorneys' fees. We affirm the trial court.

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, No. 3-04-0541 (Ill.App. Dist.3 08/02/2005)
Pursuant to an order entered October 7, 1999, dissolving the marriage of Carmen and Armando Rodriguez, the trial court awarded to Carmen maintenance of $320 per week "reviewable within four years." On November 7, 2003, Armando moved to terminate the withholding order that secured the maintenance obligation, claiming he had fulfilled the obligation. Carmen filed a response to Armando's motion to terminate, asserting essentially that Armando had not alleged sufficient cause to terminate Carmen's maintenance. On February 2, 2004, the trial court issued an order finding it lacked jurisdiction to extend or continue Carmen's maintenance after the expiration of the four-year period. The trial court based its decision on the case of Rice v. Rice, 173 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 528 N.E.2d 14 (1988). Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration and Armando filed a motion requesting a judgment that the maintenance he had paid from the date he filed his original petition to the date of the court's February 2 order be reimbursed. Carmen also filed a petition for review of maintenance. On May 13, 2004, the trial court denied Carmen's motion to reconsider and found her petition for review of maintenance to be moot. On June 18, 2004, the trial court ordered Carmen to reimburse Armando $4,480 in overpaid maintenance. Carmen appeals the ruling of the trial court. We reverse the trial court's orders.

Child custody; Visitation


Miller v. Miller, No. 4-05-0286 (Ill.App. Dist.4 08/17/2005)
In this 2004 marriage dissolution proceeding between petitioner, Dustin Miller, and respondent, Bethany Miller, the trial court limited the number of witnesses each party could call at the custody hearing. The court ultimately made Dustin the custodian of the parties' two children. [¶] Bethany appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by limiting the number of witnesses who could testify at the custody hearing. Because Bethany failed to make an adequate offer of proof regarding what testimony her additional witnesses would provide, we affirm.




Illinois Family Law Case Summaries


June 26 - July 30, 2005


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Topic List (Click for cases on that subject)
Dependent children -- Family support -- Child custody; Visitation -- Domestic Violence



Dependent children


In re A.H., No. 1-05-0521 (Ill.App. Dist.1 07/18/2005)
Following an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found respondent, D.H., to be an unfit parent because he was depraved and his repeated incarceration prevented him from discharging his parental responsibilities. . . . Following a subsequent best interest hearing, the court terminated respondent's parental rights. Respondent now appeals, contending that (1) the circuit court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) his due process right to a fair trial was denied, his ability to assist his lawyer was hampered, and the dignity of the judicial process was offended when he remained shackled during the adjudicatory hearing; and (3) his due process rights were denied when the circuit court misconstrued section 1-5 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 . . . and permitted the attorney and guardian ad litem for the minor, A.H., to intervene at the end of the State's case-in-chief and present its own case against him.*fn1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

In re R.S., No. 3-04-0140 (Ill.App. Dist.3 07/11/2005)
The respondent, Raymond S., appeals from the orders finding him an unfit parent and terminating his parental rights to R.S., K.S., and P.S. The respondent argues that the circuit court erred when it found him unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act . . . because that provision is violative of equal protection and due process. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings.

In re Austin D., No. 4-05-0129 (Ill.App. Dist.4 06/30/2005)
In December 2004, the trial court adjudged Austin D. neglected. In January 2005, the court made Austin D. a ward of the court and removed custody and guardianship from respondent, Kristina Dison. Kristina appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) denying her motion to substitute judge, (2) adjudging Austin D. a neglected minor, and (3) finding it in the best interests of Austin D. to remove him from the custody of Kristina. Because the court erred by denying the motion to substitute, we reverse and remand.

Family support


Golden v. Golden, No. 2-04-0705 (Ill.App. Dist.2 06/28/2005)
On July 26, 2000, the trial court dissolved the marriage of petitioner, Michele L. Golden, and respondent, John R. Golden. Incorporated into the dissolution order was the parties' marital settlement agreement (agreement), which provided that respondent shall pay petitioner maintenance of $1,300 per month. The agreement stated that "[m]aintenance shall be non-modifiable for three years and may only be reviewed no sooner than thirty-six (36) months after the first payment." Approximately three years later, respondent petitioned to review or terminate maintenance, claiming that the trial court should either terminate or reduce his maintenance obligation. After a hearing, the trial court found that "[respondent] does not have the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances based on the provisions of [section] 510(a--5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act [(Act) . . . and modified respondent's maintenance obligation to "$800 *** per month as and for permanent maintenance." Petitioner timely appeals, contending that the trial court (1) incorrectly interpreted section 510(a--5) of the Act as not requiring respondent to prove a substantial change in circumstances and (2) abused its discretion in modifying maintenance. We affirm.

Child custody; Visitation


Mouschovias v. Mouschovias, No. 4-03-1038 (Ill.App. Dist.4 07/14/2005)
Petitioner, Janice V. Mouschovias, and respondent, Telemachos Ch. Mouschovias, were married June 20, 1987. Three children were born as a result of the marriage, Alexander, born August 30, 1991, Margarita, born September 14, 1993, and Adonis, born May 22, 1996. Janice filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on September 17, 1996. On October 28, 2003, the court entered its final order on all remaining issues. Telemachos appeals. Janice cross-appeals. We affirm.

Domestic Violence


Best v. Best, No. 2-04-0666 (Ill.App. Dist.2 07/06/2005)
Respondent, Steven R. Devore Best, seeks review of a plenary order of protection entered against him under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (the Act) (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2002)). He contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the order, because it found petitioner, Angela K. Farlow Best, to be an unreliable witness, but nevertheless credited her testimony about an incident of physical abuse by respondent. The parties dispute whether the decision was one in which the trial court had broad discretion or whether it functioned more as a trier of fact. They therefore disagree on the proper standard of review. We determine that the Act requires the trial court to make a finding of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, and accordingly, our review is on a manifest-weight-of-the- evidence standard. In employing this standard, we conclude that the trial court acted reasonably when it found that the balance of the evidence favored petitioner. Although the trial court expressed doubts about petitioner's honesty, it chose to credit her only on points where her testimony was both corroborated and uncontradicted. We see no error in that approach. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.




Illinois Family Law Case Summaries


May 22 - June 15, 2005


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Topic List (Click for cases on that subject)
Dependent children -- Family support -- Child custody; Visitation



Dependent children


In re A.M., No. 3-04-0946 (Ill.App. Dist.3 05/24/2005)
The State filed a petition alleging that (1) the minors, A.M. and E.M., were neglected because of their mother's conduct; and (2) the children's father was unknown. Later, the court identified the respondent, J.T., as the father. The court found that the children were neglected. [¶] The State then filed a petition asking the trial court to terminate the respondent's parental rights, alleging that the respondent was unfit because of depravity . . . The court found the respondent unfit and terminated his parental rights. On appeal, the respondent argues that (1) the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and Lutheran Social Services (LSS) violated his due process rights by failing to contact him or to complete a social history for him; (2) the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding him unfit because it had not found that he neglected the children; (3) after the respondent rebutted the presumption that he was depraved because of his criminal record, he proved that he was not depraved; and (4) the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

In re Faith B., No. 98927 (Ill. 06/16/2005)
In proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 . . ., "dispositional" orders are final and appealable as of right, but orders setting permanency goals are ordinarily interlocutory, and thus appealable only at the discretion of the appellate court. . . . In this case the circuit court of Kane County set a permanency goal within a dispositional order, and we must determine whether the parent could invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction to review the permanency goal by appealing from the dispositional order. In addition, the parent contends that the circuit court's finding that the minors were abused and neglected was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In re G.W., No. 2-04-1131 (Ill.App. Dist.2 06/13/2005)
Respondent, Debra B., appeals from the orders of the trial court finding her to be an unfit parent and terminating her parental rights to G.W., J.W., and K.W. We vacate and remand.

Family support


Hightower v. Hightower, No. 2-04-0235 (Ill.App. Dist.2 06/16/2005)
The circuit court of Lake County entered judgment dissolving the marriage of petitioner, Belinda A. Hightower, and respondent, Larry M. Hightower, on the ground of irreconcilable differences. On appeal, petitioner challenges several aspects of the judgment, including grounds, child support, and dissipation. We reverse and remand as to that portion of the judgment relating to child support but we otherwise affirm.

Einstein v. Nijim, No. 4-04-0766 (Ill.App. Dist.4 06/15/2005)
In May 2000, petitioner, Kathryn Einstein, filed a petition requesting that the trial court (1) order respondent, Jason H. Nijim, to pay child support for the parties' daughter, Jordan Nijim (born June 10, 1995) and (2) set a reasonable visitation schedule for Jason and Jordan. Following a June 2004 hearing, the court ordered, in pertinent part, that Jason pay (1) $1,168.50 in monthly child support, which reflected 20% of Jason's monthly net income; (2) $7,588.32 for Jordan's past day- care expenses; (3) one-half of Jordan's future day-care expenses; (4) $864.13 for Jordan's past medical expenses; and (5) one-half of Jordan's future medical expenses. [¶] Jason appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) incorrectly calculating his net income, (2) failing to order child support in an amount below the statutory guideline of 20% of Jason's net income, and (3) ordering him to pay one-half of Jordan's past day-care and medical expenses and one-half of such future expenses. We disagree and affirm.

Child custody; Visitation


Dobbs v. Dobbs, No. 5-03-0644 (Ill.App. Dist.5 06/07/2005)
Petitioner, Hyla Jane Dobbs, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Jefferson County holding her in indirect civil contempt for her interference with visitation between her Down's syndrome daughter, Jodi, age 38, and respondent, Alva Lee Dobbs, in violation of the parties' 1991 divorce decree, and requiring that Jodi continue visitation with respondent. On appeal, petitioner argues (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order visitation between Jodi and respondent because Jodi was an adult at the time the visitation order was entered in 1991 and (2) the trial court erred in holding petitioner in indirect civil contempt. For the following reasons, we agree with petitioner and reverse the order of the circuit court.

Sproat v. Sproat, No. 2-04-1080 (Ill.App. Dist.2 06/10/2005)
Petitioner, Stella Sproat, appeals from the September 28, 2004, order of the circuit court of Du Page County awarding sole custody of the parties' two minor children to respondent, Howard E. Sproat. However, because the order reserved the issues of property distribution, classification of non-marital and marital property, maintenance, child support, and attorney fees, it was not a final and appealable order. Petitioner also appeals from the order entered on October 22, 2004, denying her motion to reconsider the custody decision, but the record is clear that the reserved issues had not yet been tried at the time this order was entered. Although the parties have not raised the question, we have a duty to consider sua sponte our jurisdiction in this case (In re Adoption of Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d 789, 790 (2000)), and we find it lacking.




Illinois Family Law Case Summaries


April 17 - May 21, 2005


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Topic List (Click for cases on that subject)
Dependent children -- Family support



Dependent children


In re Gwynne P., No. 98131 (Ill. 05/19/2005)
Gwynne P., a minor, has been a ward of the state since shortly after her birth. When Gwynne was just over a year and a half old, the State petitioned the circuit court of Cook County to terminate the parental rights of her biological parents and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to her adoption. Following the requisite hearings, the State's petition was allowed. Both biological parents appealed. The appellate court affirmed. . . . We granted the biological mother's petition for leave to appeal. . . . For the reasons that follow, we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

In re Madison H., No. 98533 (Ill. 05/19/2005)
In this appeal we determine whether section 2-27(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act), which requires a trial court to provide a factual basis for its determination "in writing," is satisfied if the court orally announces the basis for its finding and a court reporter records those statements. . . .. The appellate court concluded that the plain language of section 2-27(1) requires that the basis for the court's determination be contained in the court's written order. . . . On this point, we disagree with the appellate court. However, we affirm the appellate court for the reasons discussed below.

In re Robert S., No. 4-04-1032 (Ill.App. Dist.4 05/13/2005)
On September 13, 2004, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Michelle Schultz, as to her children, Robert S. (born August 28, 2000) and S.S. (born January 7, 1992); and on October 26, 2004, the State filed an amendment to its petition. On November 5, 2004, appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw as respondent's counsel. On November 12, 2004, the trial court granted counsel's motion and immediately proceeded to a hearing on the State's termination petition. The court found respondent unfit, and following a separate hearing that same day, the court found it was in the children's best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated.

In re K.R., No. 3-04-0674 (Ill.App. Dist.3 04/19/2005)
The State filed a juvenile petition for wardship alleging that three-month-old K.R. was abused by his father, Todd R., and neglected by his mother, respondent Caroline M. Following adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, the trial court allowed the petition and granted the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) guardianship with the right to place. Respondent appeals. She argues that (1) the finding of neglect was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) the dispositional order was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. We affirm.

Family support


Thompson v. Thompson, No. 2-04-0236 (Ill.App. Dist.2 05/20/2005)
In 1992 and 1995, on behalf of the petitioner, Diane M. Thompson, the intervenor, the Illinois Department of Public Aid, obtained judgments against the respondent, William C. Thompson, for unpaid child support. The judgments were paid via periodic income deductions. In 2004, the trial court granted the intervenor's motion to assess interest and entered a judgment for statutory interest on the child support arrearage judgments. The respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by assessing interest because, under section 505(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act . . ., the arrearage judgments did not accrue interest. According to the respondent, because the arrearage judgments were support orders under that section, the installment payments thereon were deemed a series of judgments, upon which interest did not accrue until a payment was 30 days late, . . .

Elenewski v. Elenewski, No. 4-04-0538 (Ill.App. Dist.4 05/12/2005)
On August 11, 2003, respondent, John F. Elenewski, filed a petition to terminate maintenance based on his belief that petitioner, Loretta C. Carter, had begun to cohabitate with another man sometime prior to April 30, 2002. In a June 2004 order, Judge Rebecca Simmons Foley terminated John's maintenance obligation, retroactive to the date John filed his petition to terminate maintenance. John appeals, arguing that the trial court should have terminated the maintenance portion of the unallocated support effective May 2002, when Loretta began residing with Robert L. Carter. We affirm.

Burns v. Stewart, No. 2-04-1153 (Ill.App. Dist.2 05/05/2005)
Respondent pro se, Gregory Alan Stewart, appeals the order of the circuit court of Ogle County denying his "Motion to Vacate Claim to Disability Pension Plan," which sought to vacate the amount of child support he owed. Respondent argues that the trial court misconstrued the dissolution judgment as well as the nature of the disability pension itself. Intervenor, the Department of Public Aid (Department), argues that the trial court was without power to grant the relief respondent requested and properly denied his motion. We affirm.


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